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Abstract
This paper addresses central limitations of ecosystem services and nature’s contributions to people (NCP) by developing a 
novel approach to consideration of intrinsic values of nature. Intrinsic values are seen as bundled with values of ecosystem 
services and NCP within the Life Framework, an innovative, comprehensive and easy to communicate framework of values. 
Building on work by John O’Neill, values are conceived of as related to living with, from, in and as the world. These frames 
are related to but distinct from more formal ethical justiications of intrinsic, instrumental and relational values, which strad-
dle the four Life Frames. Focusing on intrinsic values, we conceive these as ends without reference to humans as valuers, but 
which nonetheless can be articulated by people. We draw on more-than-human participatory research and post-normal science 
to promote the articulation and deliberation of perspectives and interests of the more-than-human world by an extended peer 
community. This clearly diferentiates our approach from both rights-based intrinsic value and utilitarian existence value 
approaches, although it is inclusive of them. The approach is demonstrated by an elaborate integrated marine ecosystem 
valuation, where we investigate associations between intrinsic and relational values and the four Life frames. The Life Frame-
work, operationalised through the post-normal, more-than-human participatory approach, operationalises articulated intrinsic 
values in a way that puts them on an equal footing with values of ecosystem services and NCP, providing an opportunity 
to bridge and reconcile these diferent types of value through deliberation. This enhances the recognition and procedural 
justice of valuation, while at the same time retaining the practical advantages that the ecosystem services framework brings.
Keywords Articulated intrinsic values · Relational values · Shared values · Social values · Deliberative democracy · More-
than-human participatory research · Environmental ethics
Introduction
The ecosystem services (ES) framework focuses on the 
beneits people derive from nature and the ecological pro-
cesses that underpin these, providing a powerful tool to 
argue for their protection (TEEB 2010; UK NEA 2011, 
2014; Costanza et al. 2017). Valuation of beneits provides 
policy makers with an understanding of the relative impor-
tance placed on diferent ecosystems. While this is some-
times crudely put as no price means no value and no value 
means no protection (De Groot et al. 2012), at present the 
ield of ES has vastly expanded beyond ecology and main-
stream economics to include broader shared, plural, social, 
cultural and relational values of nature (Kenter et al. 2011, 
2014, 2015, 2016b, 2019; Ives and Kendal 2014; Kenter 
2016; Chan et al. 2016, 2018; Costanza et al. 2017; Braat 
2018; Stålhammar and Thorén 2019). Recently, the Inter-
governmental Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES) introduced the term ‘nature’s contributions to peo-
ple’ (NCP) to more explicitly encompass relational values 
than associated with ES (Díaz et al. 2018). Relational values 
about nature are here considered as values with a relational 
content, that appreciate relationships between people and 
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(elements of) nature, including essential components of a 
good life (IPBES 2016, Chan et al. 2018).
However, notwithstanding these expansions, the terms ES 
and NCP still imply a unidirectional value low; the focus 
is on nature contributing to people, which disregards val-
ues for nature as an end itself and more holistic views on 
nature–human interrelations (Kenter 2018). Many of the 
critiques of and resistance to the ES concept in literature 
and practice are due to the underlying ethical concerns with 
this focus on human well-being and its inability to encom-
pass intrinsic values (McCauley 2006; Schröter et al. 2014; 
Cooper et al. 2016). Attempts in environmental economics to 
acknowledge the value of nature beyond beneits to humans 
revolve around existence or passive use values (Aldred 1997; 
Carson et al. 2001). However, in economic theory, existence 
values are still considered instrumental preferences; it is the 
(potential for) satisfaction of people’s preferences for conser-
vation that is encapsulated within this concept, not the value 
of nature for its own sake. Moreover, there are still few tools 
to elicit existence values. The main method is contingent 
valuation, which similarly relies on instrumental rationality, 
the limitations of which are widely published (e.g. Aldred 
1997; Sagof 1998; Ravenscroft 2010, 2019; Schröter et al. 
2014; Raymond et al. 2014).
Chan et al. (2012, p. 9) note: “As long as non-use, intan-
gible, and cultural values are relegated to an after-thought 
or poorly represented by ill-suited value metrics, an ES 
approach will continue to be critiqued by many”. Similarly, 
as long as intrinsic values are insufficiently integrated, 
valuation of nature will be incomplete, its legitimacy chal-
lenged, and the conservation movement hampered by tension 
between those who advocate instrumental and intrinsic para-
digms. Batavia and Nelson (2017) state the importance of 
recognising intrinsic value because it is: (1) logical, as it is 
a key reason that conservation exists; (2) practical, because 
it motivates those who are involved in conservation; and (3) 
ethical, for we are moral beings.
If these ethical values are not elicited, they may not be 
considered in subsequent decision-making (Meinard et al. 
2016) and as such “it is crucial that ecosystem service valua-
tion provide space for their expression in a manner commen-
surate with anthropocentric values” (Chan et al. 2012, p. 15).
However, a major challenge is that intrinsic values are 
typically assumed as an abstract ethical motivation: dii-
cult to elicit, let alone compare with anthropocentric values 
(Chan et al. 2016). This motivation drives nature conserva-
tion as a distinct value stream, and is relected in an entirely 
diferent set of institutions, primarily based on legal imple-
mentations (e.g. designation of protected areas, red lists, 
agreements such as CITES) justiied by biological knowl-
edge linked to broad, transcendental ethical values (e.g. pro-
tecting biodiversity is good; Mefe and Carroll 1994). This 
contrasts with the economic, social and cultural domains of 
instrumental and relational values where social values are 
derived from the elicitation, aggregation and deliberation 
of speciic, contextual anthropocentric values. These then 
feed into environmental management policies that may use 
more lexible mechanisms such as markets in ES, incentive 
schemes and community planning. This generates important 
issues: some biological entities are highly protected, some-
times at the cost of basic human needs and rights (UNOHCH 
2016), while less auspicious elements of nature are treated as 
a mere means and may be insuiciently safeguarded.
This calls for better integration of intrinsic with instru-
mental and relational values in policy and in frames such 
as that of IPBES. Building on the work of O’Neill (1992, 
2001) and O’Neill et al. (2008), this paper seeks to do so by 
reframing intrinsic value as subjective value-expressions of 
objective intrinsic value, which we call articulated intrinsic 
values for ease of reference. We situate articulated intrinsic 
values in relation to instrumental and particularly relational 
values, and to an innovative taxonomy that we call the Life 
Framework of Values, which considers living from, in, with 
and as the world (Fig. 1). The Life Framework serves to 
provide an intuitive and inclusive understanding of why 
the natural world matters, and which is able to efectively 
integrate ES or NCP and articulated intrinsic values, yet is 
less abstract and easier to grasp and communicate than the 
instrumental-relational-intrinsic trifecta as used in reference 
to ES and NCP. We operationalise our approach through 
a case study grounded in more-than-human participatory 
research (MtHPR), which extends participation to the biotic 
community as a whole, and post-normal science, which 
advocates extended peer communities for the inclusion and 
validation of multiple knowledges, values and frames.
This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the irst to 
integrate these two approaches. It further innovates in that 
it has elaborated the Life Framework from O’Neill et al.’s 
(2008) original seed, and is the irst to operationalise it 
empirically within a large-scale integrated ecosystem valu-
ation. It is one of the irst to empirically examine interrela-
tions between intrinsic and relational values and the irst 
to relate these to the Life Frames. In doing so, we seek to 
establish a more complete account of the ways in which the 
more-than-human world matters and provide a more efec-
tive theoretical and practical approach whereby diferent 
values and motivations for conservation can be considered, 
communicated and reconciled in sustainability science and 
governance.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces the Life 
Framework of Values and explores the diferent Life Frames 
in relation to intrinsic, relational and instrumental values, 
ES and NCP. In Sect. 3, we return to intrinsic values, briely 
reviewing its varieties and then developing the concept of 
articulated intrinsic values as a way to recognise the interests 
of the more-than-human world alongside beneits of nature 
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to people. Section 4 operationalises this notion, proposing 
to extend post-normal and participatory research with the 
inclusion of more-than-human interests through articulated 
intrinsic values. We discuss that the emphasis on perspec-
tive-taking and deliberation in post-normal and more-than-
human participatory approaches supports operationalisation 
of the Life Framework by allowing us to bridge conlicts 
between the diferent Life Frames and include multiple 
knowledges and ethical systems. Section 5 presents a case 
study where the Life Framework is applied in a large-scale 
integrated assessment of marine ecosystems and their ser-
vices. We explore articulated intrinsic values and their co-
emergence with relational values embedded within each of 
the Life Frames. Sections 6 and 7 discuss results and draw 
conclusions, critically reviewing the utility of articulated 
intrinsic values and the Life Framework of Values as opera-
tionalised through the innovative post-normal, more-than-
human participatory approach.
The Life Framework of Values: living from, 
in, with and as the world
Value represents the various ways in which things matter. 
O’Neill et  al. (2008) make three important distinctions 
in how the environment, nature, or less dualistically, the 
world, matters to humans. Firstly, how we live from the 
world, through for example, food and energy—this relects 
how the environment matters as a resource, a means to 
our sustenance. Secondly, how we live in it; this points 
to the world as a place that is the source or main stage of 
our life events, from where social and cultural values are 
born and recreation takes place. Thirdly, how we live with 
the world; this points to nature or non-humans as impor-
tant others, who co-exist alongside us, acknowledging that 
we are one species alongside the larger biotic community 
living on this planet. We diferentiate a fourth category, liv-
ing as the world, which points to the more-than-human as 
self, individually and collectively, for example as expressed 
in indigenous notions of oneness and kinship (e.g. Gould 
et al. 2019), embodied relational (e.g. Raymond et al. 2017) 
and phenomenological perspectives of life (e.g. Henry 1963; 
Ingold 2000), Deep Ecology (e.g. Naess 1988), and non-
dual spiritual experience (e.g. Wilber 2001). While O’Neill 
partially considers some of these elements in his discus-
sion of ‘in’ and ‘with’, the holism emphasised by the above 
perspectives prompts us to a distinct category transcending 
the people–nature duality. Together, we constitute these four 
frames as the Life Framework of Values of the more-than-
human world. The more-than-human world is our preferred 
term to refer to nature inclusive of people and culture, as 
opposed to the natural environment, non-human nature, or 
simply nature, as separate from people.
The four Life Frames and the way we conceive their rela-
tionship to the IPBES (2016) categories of intrinsic, rela-
tional and instrumental justiications of values are depicted 
in Fig. 1. Something is instrumentally valuable when it is 
valued as a substitutable means to a human end. Relational 
Fig. 1  The four Life Frames 
of Values and their relation to 
the IPBES (2016) categories 
of intrinsic, instrumental and 
relational values. ES ecosystem 
services, NCP nature’s contribu-
tions to people
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values are deined as the values relative to the meaningful-
ness of relationships, including between people and non- or 
more-than human entities, and the contributions of these 
relationships to a ‘good life’. While relational values are con-
sidered as non-instrumental in the sense of non-substitutable 
and incommensurable with instrumental values, they are 
still anthropocentric (Chan et al. 2016; IPBES 2016). The 
intrinsic value of nature in the broadest sense involves the 
importance of non- or more-than-human entities as an end 
in itself, rather than as a human end. IPBES (2016) presents 
multiple conlicting deinitions of intrinsic values, deining 
it both as subjective: “the importance that people believe a 
thing has unto itself regardless of the interests of people or 
others”; and also as “objective and inherent properties of 
an entity or a state of the world properties independent of 
recognition by humans” (pp. 18–19, emphasis added). We 
will consider subjective vs objective interpretations in more 
detail in Sect. 3.
Figure 1 illustrates our conception of intrinsic values as 
primarily associated with ‘living with’ but also with ‘as’ and 
‘in’ frames. Importantly, goods can be valued for more than 
one reason, and diferent value types straddle the four value 
categories rather than map onto them one to one. We will 
investigate the relations suggested by this diagram further 
in Sect. 6, aided by case study results.
The Life Framework is also compatible with concepts 
of ES and NCP (Fig. 2). Diferent services and contribu-
tions can map to more than one frame and the Life Frames 
encompass more diverse understandings of nature than as 
a provider of services and contributions to people. How-
ever, provisioning services and material contributions can 
be particularly associated with ‘living from’, regulating ser-
vices and contributions with ‘living with’, and cultural ser-
vices and non-material contributions with ‘living in’. ‘Living 
as’ can be associated with some context-speciic NCP. Box 1 
discusses the relation between the Life and NCP frameworks 
in more detail.
The intention of the Life Framework is not to abolish dec-
ades of thought on accounts of environmental values; rather 
it is intended as an easy-to-communicate way of typing 
Fig. 2  Examples of how generalised and context-speciic nature’s contributions to people (NCP; Díaz et al. 2018) can map onto the Life Frame-
work. The four Life Frames are not demarcated as diferent types and categories of NCP can relate to more than one frame
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plural values of the more-than human world, that more easily 
connects with citizens, practitioners and policy makers than 
more abstract taxonomies of values. Furthermore, phrasing 
values in relation to ‘living’ intuitively imbues a sense of 
egalitarianism between diferent values and the simple ele-
gance incites a natural inclination towards including each of 
the categories. As such, it provides a promising framework 
for better integration of plural values, including intrinsic 
values, into decisions.
To date, the question of how we value our environment 
has largely been characterised by a preoccupation with 
‘living from’ the world. This focus continues to attract criti-
cism, including in the way it has dominated the ES agenda 
(Gunton et al. 2017; Jax et al. 2013; Silvertown 2015; Díaz 
et al. 2018). Theoretical and methodological advances in 
our understanding of shared, cultural and relational values 
associated with ES have sought to better understand our ‘liv-
ing in’ the environment, with a growing number of studies 
using non-monetary valuation methodologies (Scholte et al. 
2015; Kenter 2016). However, while relational values are 
gaining prominence in studying ‘living in’ frames, many 
non-monetary approaches still contain an explicit or implicit 
Box 1  The Life Framework of Values and the IPBES Nature’s Contributions to People framework
Nature’s contributions to people (NCP) include ecosystem services (ES) and other conceptualisations of beneits of nature to people, such as 
nature’s gifts (IPBES 2019). The NCP framework (Díaz et al. 2018) considers NCP from two main perspectives: the generalising and the 
context-speciic perspective. This is to provide a system for comparison yet recognise that there is a diversity of context-speciic views about 
how humans engage with nature. Within the generalising perspective, 18 types of NCP are identiied within three higher level categories: 
material, non-material and regulating contributions. IPBES considers three primary justiications for why elements of nature can matter: 
they have instrumental, relational and intrinsic value (see main text, Sect. 2, for deinitions). While intrinsic values are not relected by NCP, 
they should nonetheless be considered (Pascual et al. 2017). By deining articulated intrinsic values as without reference to people as valuing 
agents, they complement NCP and ES, expressed through relational and instrumental values. The Life Framework can be associated with all 
three value justiications (Fig. 1) and its four frames can be related in various ways to the NCP categories (Fig. 2). However, rather than using 
a single metaphor for how the nature is important (namely, as contributions to people), the Life Framework more comprehensively considers 
the ways nature, or less dualistically, the more-than-human world, matters.
Living from points to how we value the world in a provisioning sense but also how it sustains us more broadly. This category spans both the 
material and non-material contributions that the world makes to humans. This ranges from food consumed and energy produced using natural 
resources to the learning taken from the environment. These values are predominantly instrumental and relational. For example, ishermen 
gain both material beneits from their livelihoods and their livelihood is also immaterially constitutive of their quality of life. Maintenance of 
options (associated with biodiversity option value; Faith 2018) and regulating contributions are important where they underpin our liveli-
hoods and sustenance.
Living with expresses that we share this planet with the more-than-human world, and is enacted in us preserving and creating space dedicated 
to nature, from spaces for wildlife in gardens to national parks. This frame also most explicitly links to biodiversity and species conserva-
tion as an end-in-itself, rather than as a source of NCP. However, it can also be associated with NCP that regulate the environment, such as 
the regulation of storms and diseases that humans live with. ‘Living with’ is associated with intrinsic values of non-human nature, relational 
values insofar as those regulating elements of nature that contribute to our well-being are deemed unsubstitutable, and instrumental values in 
terms of existence values and where regulating contributions are thought of as substitutable.
Living in can be seen to map on to the non-material contributions of the land- and seascapes that help shape (either socially or physically) how 
cultures, communities and individuals relate to place, forming and supporting cultural and personal identities. It also maps to material and 
regulating contributions where they help deine the biophysical features contributing to environmental settings. Whereas ‘living with’ empha-
sises space for nature, ‘living in’ is about the importance of nature as place. This frame relates particularly to relational values constitutive of 
well-being, including aesthetic and spiritual dimensions of places, but also includes instrumental values associated with beneits gained from 
place-based activities that are amenable to substitution and trade-of, such as many forms of recreation and tourism.
The Living as frame relects notions and experiences of the more-than-human world, rather than non-human nature. It transcends the onto-
logical or at least semantic dualism of NCP (see Kenter 2018), but can be related to practices of care, kinship and reciprocal relationships 
between people and the more-than-human. In particular, this frame opens up to lived experiences of the more-than-human world, where 
activities such as hunting, ishing and outdoor pursuits are experienced as non-separate from nature, and from an embodied perspective (e.g. 
Ingold 2011). It also relects diverse spiritual experiences of oneness. This frame primarily embeds relational and intrinsic values. Relational 
‘living as’ values denote that we can value our relations to non-humans and the more-than-human world without this relationship implying 
that we are separate from them (also see Muraca 2011). ‘Living as’ intrinsic values acknowledge that the more-than-human world and the 
non-humans inhabiting it matter for their own purposes regardless of human afairs, yet we experience or see ourselves as an embedded or 
inseparable part of this community of life.
While intrinsic, reciprocal and nondual values are acknowledged as important by IPBES, the term NCP (like its more established sibling ES) 
does not relect these values well, as it implies a one-way street of beneits from nature to people, and a separation between the two (Kenter 
2018). IPBES has sought, to some degree, to encompass these values through its context-speciic perspective, but these attempts remain 
constrained by the semantically restrictive heading of NCP. The Life Framework lifts this restriction, and can also more efectively link the 
generalising perspective and its speciic categories to context-speciic perspectives, as both generalising and context-speciic perspectives 
can be described through the four basic Life Frames without doing injustice to the diverse ontologies, epistemologies and understandings of 
values particular to indigenous and local knowledge contexts.
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instrumental perspective (Raymond et al. 2014) that limits 
the breadth of values considered. This adds to ethical con-
cerns over the ability of the ES concept to account for the 
intrinsic values that might be expressed towards the natural 
world (Jax et al. 2013). Even in deliberative case studies, 
non-human considerations can struggle to make it to the 
table (Orchard-Webb et al. 2016). Furthermore, Comberti 
et al. (2015) and Cooper et al. (2016) raise important ques-
tions about the monodirectionality of the ES framework and 
note the importance of a two-way low of value; for exam-
ple, a gardener might value biodiversity in their garden not 
just because of beneits such as aesthetic value, but also for 
them serving the garden. This aligns with the IPBES notion 
of ‘practices of care’ that relect how some people might 
value a natural landscape (Díaz et al. 2018). However, the 
IPBES term NCP, like ES, poorly relects these two-way 
afairs and values of nature independent of human ends 
(Kenter 2018).
Such two-way afairs are closely associated with intrin-
sic values, which are enacted by peoples’ concerns for the 
interests of the more-than-human world and our virtues and 
duties in relation to non-humans (Cooper et al. 2016). In the 
next section, we will develop the concept of articulated of 
intrinsic values and subsequently how it might be operation-
alised through a post-normal, more-than-human participa-
tory approach, so that intrinsic values can be considered 
alongside ES and NCP within the Life Framework.
Articulated intrinsic values
Intrinsic value is an elusive term of which multiple inter-
pretations are easily conlated (O’Neill 1992). To diagnose 
problems in the way that intrinsic values have been con-
ceived of, we draw on Rawluk et al. (2019) in this special 
feature, who point out that value concepts can be situated 
on axes of abstractness and context-dependence. Intrinsic 
values are often perceived as highly abstract and widely 
generalisable. For example, it is a common principle of 
conservation biology that, independent of context, biodi-
versity is a good in itself (Mefe and Carroll 1994). Such 
a claim is frequently tied with a moral position ascribing 
rights to the non-human world (Batavia and Nelson 2017). 
These approaches underpin much of modern conservation. 
However, accepting intrinsic values as a categorical impera-
tive can become debilitating; it might lead to implications 
that unacceptably clash with human needs (O’Neill 1992). 
For example, around half of protected areas for purposes of 
nature conservation globally have been established on indig-
enous territories, and this has frequently entailed expropria-
tion and exclusion (UNOHCR 2016). As such, conservation 
discourses regularly pit intrinsic values, expressed as rights 
of non-humans, against human land rights.
At the same time, where intrinsic value is conceived as 
highly abstract and generalisable, land management may fail 
to account for it because intrinsic value is seen as inconceiv-
able and impractical (Maguire and Justus 2008). Justus et al. 
(2009, p. 190) point to the inclusion of intrinsic value as 
“requiring an as yet undeveloped standard of value analysis 
for which no convincing methodology has been formulated”. 
Chan et al. (2016) talk of a general aversion to talking about 
abstract intrinsic values in that they are too philosophical 
and concept heavy.
Taken together, these concerns are reflective of the 
dilemma of intrinsic values in way they are often under-
stood—either they are seen as a trump card (potentially used 
disingenuously; e.g. UNOHCR 2016) or they are excluded 
from wider land use policy and planning because they can-
not be practically operationalized in valuation exercises. 
Thus, a diferent approach is needed that considers intrinsic 
values yet maintains the possibility of comparison with the 
instrumental values with which they are incommensurable 
(Chan et al. 2011, 2012; Jax et al. 2013; Martinez-Alier 
et al. 1998; Meinard et al. 2016). This points to the need for 
a more context-speciic approach for consideration of the 
more-than-human world.
To achieve this, it is worth briely exploring how there 
are multiple conceptions of intrinsic values that range in 
epistemological assumptions and ethical implications (for 
more comprehensive reviews, see O’Neill 1992, and Batavia 
and Nelson 2017). In the most common understanding of 
intrinsic value within the environmental ield, the natural 
world is seen as valuable in and of itself, independent of its 
beneit to humans. This non-instrumental value is in addition 
to its instrumental value, where the world is important as a 
resource for human purposes.
Intrinsic value can be seen as objective or subjective. 
The distinction lies in assumptions regarding where the 
evaluative properties of things reside. Ethical objectivism 
assumes that they are real properties that exist indepen-
dently of the valuer, while ethical subjectivism assumes 
that they are conferred.
‘Independent of the valuer’ can again be interpreted in 
two ways: the strong or weak sense (O’Neill 1992). The 
weak sense suggests that evaluative properties exist even 
in the absence of the human mind (Rolston 1982); this 
is the objective intrinsic value deinition used by IPBES 
(2016), but it is a diicult position to maintain (O’Neill 
et al. 2008; Svoboda 2011). In contrast, in the strong sense, 
objective intrinsic value means that evaluative properties 
can be characterised without reference to the (human) 
valuer (O’Neill 1992). For example, take this statement 
uttered by a gardener:
‘X is good for frogs’
Sustainability Science 
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In this context we can interpret the sense of ‘goodness 
for’ in two ways. Either the gardener does not want the 
frogs and so indicates X is something that is good at get-
ting rid of them, or, x is good for frogs in the sense of 
encouraging a frog’s life. In this case the gardener is the 
valuing agent, yet they consider goodness, or value, from 
the perspective of the frogs without reference to them-
selves. The observation of ‘goodness for’ thus denotes a 
particular interest as a basis for intrinsic value. However, 
this does not lead to any conclusion as to how these inter-
ests should be regarded—just like diverse human interests, 
they can be perceived as more or less important and may 
or may not translate to rights. Just because a pond is good 
for frogs does not mean we ought to create ponds every-
where. Rather, the implications that follow depend on our 
moral orientations; we will return to this point in Sect. 4.2.
In contrast to weak objective  intrinsic values, strong 
objective intrinsic values are less abstract and more con-
text-speciic in application, they can be readily observed 
and articulated based on scientific, indigenous or local 
knowledge and experience. In contrast to subjective intrin-
sic values, strong objective intrinsic values can be clearly 
diferentiated from relational values. Batavia and Nelson 
(2017, p. 370) argue that relational values are the “expe-
riential analogues” to subjective intrinsic value. For exam-
ple, if we express awe or love for nature, this is a form of 
non-instrumental value that can classify as both subjective 
intrinsic sensu Callicott (1992), and relational sensu Chan 
et al. (2018). Thus, for the remainder of this paper, given that 
non-instrumental relational values are increasingly justiied 
as a value category in their own right (Himes and Muraca 
2018), we consider subjective intrinsic values as relational 
and reserve the term articulated intrinsic values for expres-
sions of objective intrinsic value, which we conceive of in 
the strong sense.
The appeal then of this understanding of intrinsic value 
is that it provides a distinct category that informs a context-
speciic, practical consideration of the more-than human 
world, where human and non-human interests can be articu-
lated alongside one another.
Operationalising articulated intrinsic values 
and the Life Framework
Thus far, we have considered the Life Framework of Values 
as an innovative and comprehensive value system that can 
efectively bring together ES and NCP and their instrumental 
and relational values, as well as intrinsic values of the more-
than-human world. We then presented a strong objective 
interpretation of intrinsic values, which we call articulated 
intrinsic values, where values can rest with the non-human 
world rather than be a wholly anthropogenic afair. However, 
articulation of such values is subject to interpretation and 
debate. In this section, we will develop an approach to opera-
tionalise articulated intrinsic values alongside NCP and ES 
within the overarching Life Framework of Values as a vehi-
cle for inclusive integrated valuation. This section will irst 
engage with two important streams of research, which have 
thus far remained ill-connected: MtHPR (Sect. 4.1) and post-
normal science (Sect. 4.2). Both seek to extend sustainability 
science through participation and deliberation, but in slightly 
diferent ways: MtHPR seeks to include the voice of the 
broader biotic community through participatory approaches, 
whereas post-normal science seeks to include diverse expert 
and lay knowledges within an extended peer community to 
acknowledge the uncertain and normative nature of environ-
mental research. Finally, Sect. 4.3 will argue that, by ground-
ing our operationalisation of articulated intrinsic values and 
the Life Frames in MtHPR and post-normal science, we do 
not need to commit to a single ethical system for getting 
from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, and weighing diferent values against 
each other.
More‑than‑human participatory research: 
including the wider biotic community
MtHPR is an emerging methodological approach that aims 
to extend the basic principles of participatory research, such 
as collaboration and consideration of values from diverse 
perspectives (Kenter et  al. 2016a; Pellizzoni 2003), to 
include the wider biotic community (Bastian 2017). Bas-
tian (2017) refers to Bergold and Thomas (2012, p. 1), who 
describe that “the participatory research process enables co-
researchers to step back cognitively from familiar routines, 
forms of interaction, and power relationships in order to fun-
damentally question and rethink established interpretations 
of situations and strategies”. Building on this basic premise 
of participatory research, MtHPR encourages us to widen 
this process by taking on a more-than-human perspective. 
This aligns with Leopold’s motivation for the land ethic, 
which “enlarges the boundary of the community to include 
soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land” 
(Leopold 1949, p. 239). More-than-human geographers have 
described their approaches as encouraging researchers to ask 
questions of ‘what matters’ to the more-than-human world 
(Buller 2015; Hodgetts and Lorimer 2015). The attempt is 
thus not to confer values onto the more-than human world, 
but rather to recognise values residing with the more-than-
human world through participatory research (Warren 1990), 
thus aligning closely with the notion of articulated intrinsic 
values. The MtHPR approach also supports operationalisa-
tion of Life Framework, because its emphasis on perspective 
taking allows for recognition of the ‘living with’ and ‘living 
as’ frames which demand us to take on the viewpoints of 
the biotic community, whether as the other (‘living with’) 
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or as part of an extended self (‘living as’). Furthermore, the 
emphasis of the Life Framework on values as ways of fram-
ing what matters means that it invites the kind of articulation 
of multiple perspectives that participatory approaches can 
provide.
Where such participation involves deliberation, these 
approaches often appeal to communicative rationality as 
an alternative to instrumental rationality (Zografos and 
Howarth 2010). Habermas describes the aim behind com-
municative rationality as “a noncoercively unifying, consen-
sus-building force of a discourse in which the participants 
overcome their at-irst subjectively based views in favour 
of a rationally motivated agreement” (Habermas 1990, 
p315). MtHPR in this context of communicative rationality 
navigates the way in which we can articulate both human 
and more-than-human values in a deliberative setting. The 
approach answers calls from the ields of nature advocacy 
and ‘green’ Habermasian communicative rationality, to 
bring consideration of the more-than-human world to the 
forefront of deliberations through representation of non-
human interests (Dryzek 1990; Eckersley 2011; O’Neill 
2001).
Post‑normal science: including multiple knowledges 
and value frames
Consideration of and deliberation between multiple per-
spectives is also an important element of post-normal sci-
ence (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994; Ainscough et al. 2018). 
Post-normal science focuses on the principle of quality that 
incorporates issues of uncertainty, risk and multiple perspec-
tives (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994; Pellizzoni 2003; Ains-
cough et al. 2018). Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994, p. 198) 
describe the principle of quality as enabling us “to manage 
the irreducible uncertainties and ethical complexities that 
are central to the resolution of issues in post-normal sci-
ence. It entails the democratization of knowledge by exten-
sion of the peer-community for quality assurance”. MtHPR 
can extend this principle to value articulation with regard to 
the more-than-human world, potentially altering the way in 
which familiar human–nature relationships are perceived. 
This links with the post-normal science position that, at least 
in relation to complex issues, claims to truth are always lim-
ited and value laden (Ainscough et al. 2018). This is because 
decisions around environmental management involve norma-
tive stances on desired outcomes. The post-normal perspec-
tive is congruent with the notion of articulated intrinsic val-
ues, which although objective in the sense of residing with 
the object of value, can only be considered through inevita-
bly subjective, perspective-bound articulation. By enabling 
the articulation of non-human perspectives, albeit through 
human voice and subjective interpretation, a post-normal, 
more-than-human participatory approach to valuation can 
engage with non-humans as co-creators of meaning and 
value in the world (Batavia and Nelson 2017; Warren 1990).
The post-normal perspective also lends to the assessment 
and integration of values in accordance with the Life Frame-
work; each frame could invoke diferent claims to truth and 
knowledge, constituting multiple valid but incomplete per-
spectives. The recognition of four distinct frames encour-
ages science-policy-citizen deliberation as to the validity 
of knowledges associated with each of these frames. For 
example, the more complete recognition of ‘living in’ and 
‘living as’ frames in decisions may demand greater integra-
tion of humanities, indigenous and local knowledges than 
has been the case thus far in ecosystem assessment and man-
agement. This demands an extension of the peer community, 
and deliberative democratic rather than technical approaches 
to the reconciliation of value conlicts.
From ‘is’ to ‘ought’: operationalising intrinsic values 
through plural ethical systems
Crucially, our reliance on MtHPR and post-normal science 
for operationalisation of articulated intrinsic values, embed-
ded within the Life Frames, omits both the need to answer 
the ‘demarcation problem’ as characterised by debates in 
philosophy, and to choose between either deontology or con-
sequentialism with regard to moral inclusion of the more-
than-human world. The demarcation problem concerns 
what properties (e.g. life, sentience, self-awareness) should 
be used to demarcate between what has got intrinsic value 
and what has not, or to what degree (Muraca 2011). Our 
approach recognises that people harbour diferent criteria for 
demarcation (e.g. distinctness of a species might be consid-
ered a criterion for worthiness) and may classify diferently 
according to these criteria (e.g. whether a particular species 
is distinct or not), and that democratic debate is necessary 
to address these diferences (e.g., to reconcile local or indig-
enous and western scientiic perspectives on how to classify 
a species, and the ethical implications of this). From this 
perspective, the demarcation problem cannot be addressed 
by ethics alone, but may play out diferently in diverse and 
complex practical and political contexts. The Life Frames 
are important here not in prescribing what values are ulti-
mately prioritised over others, but rather in helping ensure 
that the multiple ways in which the more-than-human world 
matters are accounted for and debated.
We also consider the reconciliation of value conlicts, 
including between articulated intrinsic values and other val-
ues, as open to debate, where multiple ethical theories can 
be appealed to including consequentialism and deontology. 
Simply articulating an objective intrinsic value may be seen 
as self-evident, should we not state the implications of how 
one might act on that articulated value. In Sect. 3, we argued 
that the common equation of intrinsic values with rights is 
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problematic, having led to both human tragedies but also 
insuicient consideration of the more-than-human world if 
rights are not ascribed.
O’Neill et al. (2008) suggest an appeal to virtue ethics as 
a way of moving from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, arguing that we should 
promote the ‘goodness for’ of non-human life because for 
us to do so constitutes a good life. This perspective is also 
found in Leopold’s (1949) land ethic, which encourages us 
to “promote the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic 
community” (p. 224). According to Cafaro (2001), Leo-
pold points out that conserving non-human nature helps us 
become better people (as well as preserving human possi-
bilities). Here, the integrity and stability of the biotic com-
munity as a whole helps to guide us in acting on ‘goodness 
for’ of its parts. For example, a ‘good’ gardener might cul-
tivate a patch of land in catering for their own needs (e.g. 
food, aesthetic pleasure, wellbeing) along with the interests 
of the more-than-human world in mind; certain wildlowers 
for bees, a water feature for ish, frogs etc.
However, our operationalisation of articulated intrinsic 
values also opens the way for consequentialist consideration, 
where beneits and costs to humans and non-humans can 
be debated alongside one another. For example, someone 
might take the view that a particular habitat is ‘good for bats’ 
(articulated intrinsic value), but the negative consequences 
to bats of a wind farm being developed there are outweighed 
by positive ones to people and indeed other life, by help-
ing to address the climate emergency; or alternatively that 
bats are so severely declining that costs to bats outweigh 
the wider beneits. Note that from this perspective, we are 
not suggesting these diferent values are commensurable, 
or even strongly comparable (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998, 
1999); rather, that democratic debate may acknowledge and 
consider consequences to non-humans without reference to 
rights.
While virtue ethics and consequentialism can thus pro-
vide pragmatic and context-speciic enactment of articulated 
intrinsic values, articulation of intrinsic value can also be 
directly coupled to articulation of rights. For example, Don-
gria Kondh in Orissa, India, have opposed bauxite mining 
of Nyamgiri mountains because mining crosses the interest 
of the mountains themselves, which are seen as alive and 
sacred, and their rights of protection to be inviolable (Tem-
per and Martinez-Alier 2013).
As such, it is not our purpose here to advocate a sin-
gle approach to arriving at moral claims; a strong objective 
concept of intrinsic values provides advantages regardless 
of whether one takes a virtue-based, consequentialist, deon-
tological or other ethical approach (O’Neill 1992). Articu-
lation of intrinsic values may then be considered through 
recognising the weak comparability of plural values, 
which forms the bedrock of deliberative democracy and 
deliberative ecological economics (Martinez-Alier et al. 
1998). Post-normal science underpins the acknowledgment 
of this plurality while MtHPR opens up a space to draw out 
articulated intrinsic values, and the Life Frames provide a 
vehicle for integrating and accessing them along with instru-
mental and relational values in an easily communicable way.
Case study: integrated valuation of marine 
ecosystems
We applied the Life Framework-based, post-normal, more-
than-human participatory approach in an integrated valu-
ation as part of the large-scale UK Marine Ecosystems 
Research Programme (MERP). The valuation included 
coupled ecological-economic modelling of the impacts of 
a number of hypothetical social-ecological scenarios on 
marine ecosystems and their services (Kenter et al. forth-
coming), plus qualitative cultural work (Ainsworth et al. 
2019) in two large-scale case regions: the West Coast of 
Scotland and the South West of England. The scenarios 
were co-developed with stakeholders and their impacts 
collectively deliberated, weighing the diverse values that 
arose from the diferent research strands, including articu-
lated intrinsic values, to form shared social values around 
diferent marine policy options. Here we focus on the pre-
deliberative, qualitative work which focused on articulat-
ing intrinsic and relational values within the diferent Life 
Frames. Our motivation for the focus on intrinsic and rela-
tional values was irstly that within the overall valuation, 
instrumental values were well-represented by elaborate 
modelling approaches focused on instrumental values of ES, 
and secondly that while the diference between instrumental 
and intrinsic values is well-established, the relation between 
intrinsic and relational values is a matter of recent debate 
(Batavia and Nelson 2017; Stålhammar and Thorén 2019; 
Kenter et al. 2019) and has seen little empirical investigation 
(Klain et al. 2017).
Forty stakeholders were identiied and invited to partici-
pate in a video-recorded interview. Sampling was purposive 
to represent a broad cross-section of marine stakeholders. 
Participants were selected from a comprehensive list of 289 
stakeholder organisations and groups compiled from previ-
ous research, plus snowball sampling. Participant selection 
was informed by an inluence–interest matrix. Participants 
were particularly targeted with high levels of interest but low 
levels of inluence in marine management decisions, relect-
ing deliberative-democratic inclusivity aims (Tewdwr-Jones 
and Allmendinger 1998; Kenter et al. 2016c). Table 1 lists 
participants and their sectors.
Following Ranger et al. (2016), recordings were compiled 
in a documentary ilm that provided the vehicle for transmit-
ting value expressions to the subsequent deliberative group 
and wider audience in an eicient and accessible format. The 
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interview script, presented in more detail by Ainsworth et al. 
(2019), was structured around key themes identiied for the 
larger purpose of the MERP project relating to understand-
ing respondents’ activities, experiences, identities, capaci-
ties and values and how these might be afected by poten-
tial changes in the marine environment under the diferent 
scenarios. To speciically prompt participants to articulate 
intrinsic values, two questions were included to encourage 
consideration of the more-than human perspective (Table 2).
Analysis
Interviews were transcribed and analysed using Nvivo 11 
(QSR International). The analysis adopted a theory-driven 
approach (Bryman 2008). The codebook built on the IPBES 
general framework (Díaz et al. 2015; the most recent ver-
sion at the time) and UK National Ecosystem Assessment 
framework for cultural ES (Church et al. 2014; Fish et al. 
2016). We added two intrinsic value codes to investigate the 
research questions explored here: the irst denoting intrin-
sic value as non-instrumental value broadly, including sub-
jective and objective conceptions and references to rights 
that might imply either. The second was a more focused 
daughter-code for articulated intrinsic values, which catego-
rised speciic examples of statements that could be char-
acterised without reference to the evaluating agent, where 
participants explicitly described non-human interests and 
ends or articulated non-human perspectives. We investigated 
the co-emergence between these categories and relational 
values. The latter were indicated by two codes derived from 
the IPBES framework: ‘relationship with Mother Earth’ and 
‘interdependence among human beings, other living species 
and the elements of nature’. Further, we considered whether 
the more-than-human prompts led to an increase in refer-
ences to articulated intrinsic and/or relational value codes.
Finally, to examine how articulated intrinsic values and 
relational values mapped on to the Life Framework, four 
daughter codes relecting the Life Frames were added to 
each of these codes for articulated intrinsic and relational 
values. Two researchers coded the data and four inter-coder 
reliability tests were carried out (Table 3), suggesting sub-
stantial level of agreement between coders. To resolve disa-
greements, the coders clariied terms and discussed difer-
ences in coding approaches and shared techniques for the 
remainder of the coding process.
Table 1  Sample of stakeholders 
by sector and respective 
backgrounds
Primary sector No. of participants Secondary sector No. of participants
Provisioning 15 Gear types  Hand 2
 Static 4
 Mobile 1
Fisheries 4
Aquaculture 4
Regulatory 12 NGO 6
Government 3
Research 1
Strategic partnerships 2
Tourism, leisure, 
recreation
11 Diving 2
Angling (charter boat 
ishing)
4
Wildlife (general) tour-
ism
5
Local residents 2
Table 2  Prompt questions to 
encourage consideration of the 
more-than-human perspective
Question
5 e) How could we better represent the interests of marine species and habitats in this area 
within management decisions?
5 f) What management outcomes would most beneit marine species and habitats in this area?
Table 3  Kappa scores for the 
four interviews where inter-
coder reliability tests were 
undertaken
Scores > 0.6 indicate substantial 
agreement (Landis and Koch 
1977)
Participant Kappa
P#10WCOS 0.764
R#11WCOS 0.620
P#1SW 0.698
R#4SW 0.734
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Results
The code ‘non-instrumental value’ was referenced at 146 
points in the data and examples were cited in 30 of 40 inter-
views. ‘Articulated intrinsic value’ made up 91 of these ref-
erences across 27 sources. The points of diference between 
articulated intrinsic values and other non-instrumental val-
ues were relected in people talking of nature’s right to exist 
or in describing nature simply as ‘invaluable’, but without 
a clear example of value characterised without reference to 
people. Articulated intrinsic values were prevalent across 
the vast majority of regulatory (79%), tourism (70%) and 
local resident (100%) participants, but less prevalent with 
the provisioning sector (46%) (Table 4). Participants regu-
larly took on non-human perspectives, as seen in quote A 
(Table 5), where the participant talked of the limpets as a 
“window into another world” before asking what it might be 
like to be them, and quote D, where a diver talks of having 
a peek into another world where things play out as if they 
weren’t even there.
In terms of the Life Framework, there were examples 
of ‘living with’, in’ and ‘as’ throughout the intrinsic and 
relational values data. Of the 91 articulated intrinsic value 
examples, 60 references provided examples of ‘living with’. 
There were 17 references to ‘living as’; for example, quote 
B pointed to a holistic systems perspective of ecosystem 
interactions, living as part of the web of life. There were 13 
references to ‘living in’, exempliied by quote D, where the 
marine environment is set as a stage for recreation (diving). 
There was only one reference to articulated intrinsic value 
relating to ‘living from’, quote E, which recognised conlict 
between the good for a harbour and the species landed.
The more-than-human prompts did not increase articu-
lated intrinsic values, with 57 references across 20 inter-
views before the prompts and 34 references after.
There were many examples of relational values, with 162 
references made across 36 of the interviews to ‘interdepend-
ence among human beings, other living species and the ele-
ments of nature’ and 139 references across 36 interviews 
to ‘relationship with Mother Earth’. These codes were not 
mutually exclusive, with the aggregate number of relational 
value references being 274 across 38 of 40 sources. There 
was no overlap between articulated intrinsic and relational 
value codes, but 14 relational value references were coded 
as other non-instrumental values, where for example partici-
pants described love for the wildlife and places they lived in.
Examples of references to the relational codes ranged 
from participants talking about how the natural environment 
made them feel to how they perceived the role of people in 
nature (Table 6). In terms of the Life Framework, of the 
162 ‘interdependence’ references, 69 were coded as exam-
ples of ‘living in’, 43 as ‘living with’, 34 as ‘living as’ and 
16 as ‘living from’. 54 of the ‘relationship with Mother Ta
b
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Table 5  Examples of articulated intrinsic values with associated categories of the Life Framework of Values
Participant sector Quote Example of articulated intrinsic value Life Frame
Regulatory A I feel these places are precious, they are windows on a world that is terribly important to 
us, that we totally overlook… If you think of yourself as one of these, you can ask a kid 
to think of itself as a limpet, and they start to think about, How does it feed? How far is 
it moving? How does it feel when I knock it of a rock?
Living with
Provisioning B You know, we’re not just looking at sea here, we’re looking at runof, and we’re looking 
at, you know, reforestation and everything to support an environment, because we’re 
starting to look at a bigger picture that is the planet, and that is a single organism, and 
you can’t say that the bee does not belong to the lower, it’s the same organism, it’s just 
the bee does something else, and eventually will come and meet the lower, but that 
whole system is of something much bigger. And then all of a sudden, we think actually 
I’m part of something, too, you know. And I like it
Living as
Tourism, leisure, recreation C I think really and in many ways you’ve gotta explain to people, these animals don’t think 
like human beings…They can react in totally diferent ways, mainly that they’re act-
ing as a community, their own way, they’re ishing and everything and just trying to 
explain to people that they’re wild, they’re wild animals and not trying to control them 
but we’ve gotta control ourselves and give them maybe a bit more freedom to do what 
they wanna do
Living with
Tourism, leisure, recreation D I felt that we weren’t intruding in, we aren’t impacting on their environment really. Yeah, 
that was great, we’ve had locks of gannets diving all around the boat, ya know, loads 
of ‘em. Well over 50, 60 gannets just… start diving into shoals of ish and then we’ve 
been through a pod of common dolphins and we’ve literally looked around on a lat, 
calm day and you can see well over 100 dolphins, further out, some ishing, some bow 
riding with us, others just ishing in groups and when they’re ishing, dolphins, they’ve 
not got an interest (in what we’re doing)
Living in
Regulatory E We’ll get 10,000 boxes of squid in the next 3 weeks, which is fantastic for the harbour’s 
bank account but it’s not great for the squid
Living from
Table 6  Examples of relational values with associated categories of the Life Framework of Values
Participant sector Quote Example of relational value Life Frame
Provisioning A That is really brought home to you when you’re in that environment, cause there’s not 
really all the distractions and trappings of modern life which kind of cover that up. It’s 
very clear to see that out there. It’s probably why I go out there, to clear my head from 
a lot of the stuf that goes on here. It makes it much more understandable, simple
Living in
Regulatory B I ind it very relaxing being in the sea. I ind it nicer to be in the sea than not. So that’s 
why a lot of my leisure activity is based around being in the water. And, you know 
two weekends ago we were paddle boarding with porpoises in the surf with us. So that 
makes a diference about how you feel about somewhere as well as when you can have 
that kind of interaction with wildlife; that kind of stuf without having the impact on 
them during that point
Living in
Local Resident C To try and pinpoint any one place and say that’s more special than another is impossible 
because they’re all special for diferent reasons. There’s fantastic colonies of birds 
on some of these islands which rely on the sand eels and it’s amazing to watch them. 
There’s nothing quite like watching a gannet dropping straight out of the sky like an 
arrow into the water to catch ish. It’s just unbelievable. And it is a very good place to 
live because sea eagles live here too, they rely on the ish
Living with
Tourism, leisure, recreation D But you’re actually being out there, participating, actually being out there in nature, 
experiencing the weather and the environment as its best, an at its worst of course. You 
don’t know what you’re gonna catch which is part of the excitement
Living as
Provisioning E I’m the seventh generation to live in the house. I don’t say they’ve all been ishermen, 
but my dad certainly was, and I know my great grandfather had a boat and used to put 
a few pots out and row people around the bay. It’s just something I feel we’ve always 
done. And I’ve always done it from a very small child… It’s a shame dad’s not around 
to hear that, but it does make me smile
Living from
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Earth’ references related to ‘living in’, 49 to ‘living with’, 
22 to ‘living from’ and 14 to ‘living as’ (Fig. 3). Expres-
sions of ‘living in’ related to therapeutic beneits of being 
in and on the sea and interacting with wildlife (quotes A-B). 
Relational values associated with ‘living with’ expressed 
love, awe and amazement with observing other species and 
places (quote C). Relational values in the ‘living as’ frame 
related not to observing but participating in nature, being 
a part of it in close relation with the elements (quote D). 
Relational values associated with ‘living from’ considered 
ishing as part of one’s identity (quote E) or with aqua-
culture as a form of animal husbandry rather than purely 
instrumental production. 
Following the prompts, the number of sources and refer-
ences to the ‘interdependence’ code substantially increased 
(from 17 to 34 sources and 40 to 94 references). There was 
a proportionally smaller increase at the ‘relationship with 
Mother Earth’ code (from 28 to 33 sources and 61 to 72 
references).
Discussion
Our case was the irst empirical study to apply the Life 
Framework of Values, operationalised through a post-nor-
mal, more-than-human participatory approach. Pre-deliber-
ative qualitative work within a larger integrated valuation of 
marine ecosystems speciically focused on articulated intrin-
sic values, their diferences and associations with relational 
values, and how they might co-emerge within the diferent 
Life Frames.
The substantial number of sources referring to articu-
lated intrinsic values throughout the interviews suggests 
our approach was successful in allowing a space for their 
expression. Articulated intrinsic values were expressed in 
ways that allowed them to be considered and deliberated 
alongside anthropocentric instrumental and relational val-
ues. For example, Table 5, D, relects how recreationists 
consider wildlife by taking on the perspective of dolphins 
and gannets. This context-speciic consideration of the 
more-than human world does not suggest a no-go zone 
in the area that might be ensued by more abstract notions 
of intrinsic value. Rather, it recognises perspectives and 
interests without reference to people as valuers, expanding 
our ‘ethical envelope’ (Everard et al. 2016), but in a way 
that can be compared to beneits to people. As such, our 
approach, where diverse stakeholders, informed by their 
local knowledge, were able to articulate intrinsic alongside 
relational and instrumental values across the diferent Life 
Frames, aligns with the post-normal call to extend the peer 
community, democratise knowledge and values and more 
inclusively face ethical complexities of environmental 
issues (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994).
There were substantially more expressions of non-
instrumental values as such interests and perspectives than 
as other non-instrumental value statements. This pointed 
to a preference for expressing context-speciic observa-
tions as opposed to more abstract notions of intrinsic 
values like assignments of context-independent rights. 
For example, in Table 5, C, a respondent talks about how 
particular species act in particular ways of their own, and 
we should “…give them maybe a bit more freedom to do 
Fig. 3  Proportion of references 
to articulated intrinsic and 
relational values associated with 
diferent Life frames
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what they wanna do”. The articulated intrinsic value is 
expressed by the participant as a description of goodness 
for the species they are talking about independent of peo-
ple, followed by an ought-statement noting that we should 
let them seek that good.
Intrinsic and relational values
Our expectation was that explicitly prompting for considera-
tion of ‘goodness for’ the more-than-human world would 
bring out articulated intrinsic values more directly and 
speciically. This was not the case, as it appeared that such 
values were already prominent and explicit. More curious 
was the substantial increase in relational values following 
the prompts. Perhaps, if non-human interests had already 
been articulated, prompting for them might have encour-
aged respondents to relect more on their relations and inter-
dependence with marine life rather than rather than to re-
articulate previously expressed non-human interests. Indeed 
the results displayed a strong co-emergence of articulated 
intrinsic and relational values. This relects that participants 
may observe objective evaluative properties of non-human 
entities without reference to people, and at the same time 
relate to these entitities more subjectively, giving expression 
to their own feelings and experiences. While these may be 
two sides of a coin, they paint a diferent picture. For exam-
ple, Table 6, comment C, seems similar to Table 5, comment 
D, where both describe being in the presence of birds feed-
ing. However, the former talks of how “it’s amazing to watch 
them” and how “it’s a very good place to live because”, 
indicating the relational quality of the species and habitats 
with regard to the participant’s own experiences, whereas 
in the latter, the focus is on the perspective of gannets and 
dolphins and how they are doing something irrespective of 
human observation. This example illustrates how articulated 
intrinsic values are closely associated with perspective-tak-
ing, articulated by the participant stating that animals have 
not got an interest in what people are doing, but are “acting 
in their own way”. This quote articulates intrinsic value not 
through a speciic interest (e.g. ishing nets are not good for 
dolphins) but reveals a recognition by the respondent that 
animals seek a good of their own, relecting that they have 
interests independent of humans and that these need to be 
taken into account.
Thus, the quotes in Tables 5 and 6 illustrate how the co-
emergence of relational and intrinsic values was embedded 
in narratives, eventful stories about the environment where 
the narrator alternates as observer of the environment (‘liv-
ing with’), subject on the environmental stage (‘living in’), 
participant in the web of life (‘living as’), and beneiciary 
of its resources (‘living from’). O’Neill et al. (2008) points 
out that narratives intimately mix descriptive and normative 
content. The normative content of narratives is not always 
easily characterised in conventional consequentialist, deon-
tological and virtue terms, with evaluations often implicit 
from the way the story is structured and told, and difer-
ent value justiications intermingled. This is also evidenced 
by recent work on cultural ES valuation. Stålhammar and 
Pedersen (2017) noted that their participants found it dif-
icult to describe their values when identiied as axiologi-
cal types. More often, values were expressed in discussions 
about relationships with nature and understanding how these 
experiences made them feel. Kenter et al. (2016a) used a 
narrative-based approach as part of an integrated valuation 
with marine recreationalists. It appears from their results 
that relational expressions of place identity gave rise to 
articulation of intrinsic values, and vice versa.
Given that our deinition of articulated intrinsic values 
allowed for a clear distinction with relational values, no ref-
erences were coded to both. However, the broader under-
standing of intrinsic values as non-instrumental overlapped 
with relational values in various cases of subjective intrinsic 
values sensu Callicott (1992), such as love and amazement. 
This supports that relational values as ‘experiential ana-
logues’ can be entangled with notions of the intrinsic worth 
of non-humans (Batavia and Nelson 2017; Stålhammar and 
Thorén 2019).
These results make sense, as it appears unintuitive to 
value something without having any form of relationship 
with it. This relationship can be direct, as for example in a 
Hawaiian case described in rich detail in this special fea-
ture by Gould et al. (2019), but could also be quite indirect. 
For example, those in the west who value tropical rainforest 
are likely to still feel some sense of emotional connection 
with the object of value, through holistic concepts such as 
‘mother earth’ or through media such as nature documenta-
ries. Relational values may also explain the economic con-
cept of ‘warm glow’ (Becker 1974) that economists use to 
re-classify other-regarding values as utility to oneself (Car-
son et al. 2001).
This discussion raises the question of why we should spe-
ciically seek out intrinsic values if so often they appear to 
associate with relational ones. There are at least two reasons: 
(1) doing so explicitly acknowledges the procedural justness 
of including goodness-for the more-than human world; (2) 
not all methods that seek to assess relational values may also 
articulate intrinsic values.
As to the irst, subjective intrinsic values may be embed-
ded within relational values such as place attachment and 
cultural identities. However, we have evidenced that articu-
lated intrinsic values can be clearly distinguished. While 
relational values may well be non-instrumental in the sense 
of denoting the importance of relationships that are an end 
in themselves and/or not substitutable (Himes and Muraca 
2018), they are still anthropocentric. If intrinsic values are 
not distinctly articulated and presented, there is a clear risk 
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that non-human perspectives are insuiciently included 
within consequent deliberations and decisions (Piccolo 
2017). For example, Orchard-Webb et al. (2016) pointed 
out that in their deliberative democratic monetary valuation, 
they were unable to efectively include more-than-human 
considerations, because nobody within their group of delib-
erators was charged with this perspective. To achieve pro-
cedural justice and ‘green’ deliberative democracy (Arias-
Maldonado 2007; Dryzek 1990; Eckersley 2011), we need 
to operationalise intrinsic values in such ‘new democratic 
spaces’ (Irvine et al. 2016; Kenter 2016), and this can be 
efectively achieved through articulation of ‘goodness for’ 
the more-than-human by taking on non-human perspectives.
Second, not all understandings of relational values or 
methods to assess them accommodate articulated intrinsic 
values. For example, some of the originators of the rela-
tional values term within the ield of ecosystems knowledge 
recently applied a quantitative psychological indicator-based 
approach (Klain et al. 2017). The successful study helped 
clarify social-psychological relational values, but did not 
rhyme with articulated intrinsic values in terms of either 
value types or epistemological assumptions. The authors 
distinguished relational values from a more established cat-
egory, biospheric values, but biospheric values in the social-
psychological sense do not equate with intrinsic values; they 
are a transcendental values category, relecting people’s 
broad pro-biosphere principles, such as seeking harmony 
with nature. In contrast, as discussed in Sect. 3, articulated 
intrinsic values are fundamentally contextual rather than 
transcendental, associated with speciic objects of value (see 
Kenter et al. 2015, 2019; Raymond and Kenter 2016 for dis-
cussion of these terms); in this study, for example, gannets 
and limpets were seen to hold intrinsic value. In terms of 
epistemological assumptions, the post-normal approach that 
we ground articulated intrinsic values in assumes that, even 
whilst intrinsic values are associated with objective proper-
ties that can be studied using scientiic methods, their articu-
lation is ultimately subjective, and metric-based approaches 
are on their own insuicient to relect them. Articulated 
intrinsic values involve perspective taking; to understand 
these perspectives a discursive approach is necessary such as 
the interpretive-deliberative approach presented here.
Value of the Life Framework to environmental 
governance
Such a discursive approach naturally gives rises to questions 
of how people frame the more-than-human world in relation 
to themselves. Our case results showed that the diferent 
stakeholder groups all valued the marine environment in 
multiple ways, each of which spanned multiple Life Frames 
of value. For example, the quote from Table 6, C points 
to the value of ‘living with’ the natural world, through the 
sharing of a place with other species, Table 5, D points to 
the value of ‘living in’ it, with the natural world being the 
stage for a tourist activity. This denotes the importance of 
recognising that both relational and articulated intrinsic val-
ues can be associated with a frame of nature out there to be 
preserved or a sense of the natural world as our life stage 
(Figs. 1, 3). Both can also sit within a ‘living as’ frame, 
articulating a sense of being part of nature (Tables 5, B; 
6, D). Crucially, while more intrinsic and relational values 
came from the regulatory sector, provisioning stakeholders 
also talked about ‘living with’, ‘in’ and ‘as’ the world, not 
just ‘living from’.
The ability of Life Frames to cross diferent interests  
makes the framework a boon in environmental govern-
ance, particularly with regard to participatory approaches. 
Acknowledging the validity and complementarity of easily 
communicable value frames allows for an approach that is 
both comprehensive and inclusive, but moreover an avenue 
for identifying shared values where there are conflicts. 
Furthermore, our discussion of the co-emergence between 
context-speciic, articulated intrinsic and relational val-
ues highlights the value of the Life Framework as a less 
abstract approach to values, as the often-nuanced difer-
ences between relational and articulated intrinsic values 
may be neither evident nor particularly relevant to practi-
tioners. While environmental justice demands the inclusion 
of non-human perspectives and interests within our policy 
deliberations, structuring such deliberations according to 
the Life Frames could provide a more efective vehicle for 
characterising value conlicts and addressing value plural-
ity in sustainability policy and practice than by using the 
instrumental–relational–intrinsic trifecta.
Our addition of ‘living as’ to O’Neill et al.’s (2008) origi-
nal three ways in which they recognised that the more-than-
human world matters, provided an important, distinct cat-
egory, incorporating a sense of wholeness (e.g. Table 5, B) 
and value arising from “lived experience” (Díaz et al. 2018, 
p. 17) as exempliied by Table 6, D. The frame is important 
in allowing for the articulation and expression of these value 
types in ways that are conceptually and experientially less 
dualistic and more embodied. ‘Living as’ was associated 
with articulated intrinsic values and relational values alike. 
‘Living as’ intrinsic values relect that nature has its own 
purposes, yet we experience or see ourselves as an embed-
ded or inseparable part of this picture. ‘Living as’ relational 
values express that we can relate to the non- and more-
than-human, without this relationship implying two that are 
bounded ontologically. This corresponds to Muraca’s (2011) 
conception of relationships as ontologically constitutive to 
entities engaged in them: we are deined by these relation-
ships. The recognition of these values in our case study sug-
gests that such non-dual values are not only found in indige-
nous experience, Deep Ecology and spiritual traditions such 
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as Suism, Hinduism and Buddhism, but could in fact be 
ubiquitous ‘on the ground’ in diverse contexts where people 
‘dwell’ (Ingold 2000) in nature.
Conclusions
Democratic debate and decision-making entails weigh-
ing the often-conlicting values, interests and purposes of 
diverse stakeholders. The deliberative turn (Rodela 2012) 
and increased attention to post-normal approaches in eco-
system management (Ainscough et al. 2018) has meant 
increased attention to justice with regard to whose values 
are considered and whose voice is heard (Kenter et al. 2019). 
Articulating the interests of non-humans has a long his-
tory (e.g. Stone 1972), but is now particularly salient given 
the increasing emphasis on nature as service provider and 
contributor to human well-being. By considering intrinsic 
values as context-speciic, subjective articulations of objec-
tive evaluative properties, the interests and perspectives of 
non-human stakeholders can be directly expressed along-
side those of human ones. Instead of as abstract phenomena, 
intrinsic values can be operationalised as debatable proposi-
tions of ‘goodness for’, which can be given normative weight 
according to the goals we seek as a democratic society. This 
way, social values of ecosystems can be extended to the 
more-than-human, addressing important ethical concerns 
with the ES framework (Jax et al. 2013; Silvertown 2015).
While we have demonstrated how it is possible to practi-
cally extend ES or NCP approaches by combining them with 
articulated intrinsic values, it is not possible to fully relect 
intrinsic values within them, as services and contributions 
to people by deinition exclude values without reference to 
human beings. However, our case results suggest that articu-
lated values were nonetheless intimately intertwined with 
relational values to people. A better understanding of the 
associations between the two is an important area for future 
research. Intrinsic and relational values of nature can be 
considered two sides of a coin, yet intrinsic values need to 
be distinctly articulated to ensure the recognition of unique 
non-human perspectives, which need their own representa-
tion at the values table.
The recognition of diverse values within multiple value 
frames—living from, with, in and as the world—provides 
a nuanced approach to understanding these perspectives 
and relating them to an easy to understand and communi-
cate taxonomy of why the more-than-human world matters. 
The intuitive simplicity and comprehensiveness of the Life 
Framework provides an avenue for enhancing inclusivity and 
transcending the one-sidedness and anthropocentrism of ES 
and NCP. When we recognise that, regardless of background, 
stakeholders typically harbour and express more than one 
Life Frame, this deies stereotyping stakeholders according 
to their narrow interests and allows the Life Framework to 
become an efective tool for better recognising each other’s 
perspectives and experiences, and inding shared social 
values for sustainability. Further research might investigate 
how the Life Frames are responded to by diferent decision 
makers and stakeholders when presented with them more 
explicitly, and how the Life Framework can be used as a way 
of framing valuation beyond ES and NCP and as a vehicle 
for navigating environmental conlicts.
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